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Article 12

Forthwith Service, Rule 4(m) and the Maritime
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Suits in Admiralty Acti (SAA) conditionally allows
plaintiffs to sue the United States in admiralty. One condition
to this allowance is that plaintiffs "forthwith" serve their
admiralty complaints on the United States. 2 At first glance,

* This Comment was prepared in the wake of an internship with the government office responsible for representing the United States in all admiralty actions-the Admiralty & Aviation Litigation Section, Torts Branch, Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C. It does not pretend, however, to represent the views,
official or otherwise, of that office.
1 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-52 (1988) (amending ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525 (1920))
(waiving sovereign immunity in admiralty actions, thus placing the United States
under the same admiralty law liabilities as any private shipowner, with two
exceptions: one, United States vessels could be neither seized nor arrested; two,
actions against the United States only would be allowed to proceed in personam);
see 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-90 (1988) (amending the Public Vessels Act, ch. 428, 43
Stat. 1112 (1925)) (providing a remedy against the United States personally for
actions arising from the operation of public vessels; and, in § 782, adopting the
conditions and procedural mechanisms of the SAA); see also 1 MARTIN J. NORRIS,
THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 8:1-2 (4th ed. 1990); 2 MARTIN J.
NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 28:1 (4th ed. 1985) (discussing the background and
scope of the SAA).
2 46 U.S.C. app. § 742 (commanding the admiralty plaintiff to "forthwith
serve a copy of his [or her] libel on the United States . . . . "); Libby v. United
States, 840 F.2d 818, 820 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that "the conditions contained
in § 742 [of the SAA], including the forthwith service requirement, are necessary
terms of the government's consent to be sued"); Watts v. Pinkney, 752 F.2d 406,
408 (9th Cir. 1985); Amelia v. United States, 732 F.2d 711, 712 (9th Cir. 1984);
Kenyon v. United States, 676 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1981) (declaring that the
"congressional command of § 742 [regarding forthwith service) is a condition
precedent to the congressional waiver of . . . sovereign immunity"); City of New
York v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 278 F.2d 708, 710 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. dismissed,
371 U.S. 907 (affirming that even "technical requirements for service of process
upon the government, when it has waived sovereign immunity, must be strictly
complied with"). Contra Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Mon River Towing, Inc.,
772 F.2d 62, 63-66 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that § 742's forthwith service
requirement has been superseded by the 120 day service limit of Rule 4(m) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see Gregory J. Ressa, Note, Rule 4(j) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Forthwith Service Requirement of the
Suits in Admiralty Act, FORDHAM L. REV. 1195 (1986) (arguing that § 742's
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the way this condition works is simple: "No forthwith service,
no admiralty action."3 Closer scutiny, however, reveals the
forthwith service condition to be all but simple.
To begin with, there is the problem of determining when
service is sufficiently forthwith, since the SAA does not define
forthwith. From a plain language standpoint, forthwith means
immediately, now, straightaway, without delay, promptly, and
with all reasonable dispatch. 4 Thus, the admiralty plaintiff
might safely assume that service on the day of or just after
filing would be sufficiently forthwith. But what about service
after 2, 15, 30, 45, 60, or 120 days? As it turns out, the courts
are relatively clear about the smaller and the larger time
periods-2, 15, 60 and 120 days. The smaller time periods
generally count as forthwith, the larger ones generally do not. 5

forthwith service requirement is no longer a condition on a plaintiff's right to sue
the United States in admiralty because that requirement is superseded by the
service limit of Rule 4(m)).
Caveat: The United States typically raises the 'failure to serve forthwith'
defense in the form of a Rule 12(b)(1), FED. R. CIV. P., lack of jurisdiction motion
and does so, if at all, as its response to the admiralty plaintiff's complaint. E.g.,
infra, at note 7 (most of the cases in this list involved a United States' 12(b)(1)
motion made in lieu of an answer to the original complaint).
3 Appellee's Brief at 15, Landry v. United States, No. 93-4351, 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS 7656 (5th Cir. Mar. 29, 1994).
4 See, e.g., BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 492 (3d ed. 1969); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 654 (6th ed. 1990); 37 C.J.S. Forthwith § 1 (1953 & Supp. 1992);
WILUAM C. BURTON, LEGAL THESAURUS 233 (Steven C. De Costa et al. eds., 2d ed.
1992); THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 558 (Jess Stan
& Laurence Urdang eds., 1983); WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGAL THESAURUs'
DICTIONARY 335 (West 1985); WEBSTER'S TIDRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
895 (Philip B. Gove et al. eds., 1971); 17 WORDS & PHRASES Forthwith 605-633
(perm. ed. & Supp. 1993).
5 Smaller time periods found to be forthwith: Libby, 840 F.2d at 821 (24
days); Phillips v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 629 F. Supp. 967, 971 (S. D.
Miss. 1986) (52 days, because the United States received constructive notice ten
days after initial filing); Gajewski v. United States, 540 F. Supp. 381, 384-385
(C.D.N.Y 1982) (18 days).
Larger time periods found not to be forthwith: Watts, 752 F.2d at 408 (33
months); Amelia, 732 F.2d at 713 (63 days); Kenyon, 676 F.2d at 1231 (60 days);
Barrie v. United States, 615 F.2d 829, 830 (9th Cir. 1980) (64 days); Owens v.
United States, 541 F.2d 1386, 1387 (9th Cir. 1976) (58 days), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
945 (1977); Battaglia v. United States, 303 F.2d 683, 685-86 (2d Cir.)
(approximately 135 days), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 907 (1962); McAllister Brothers,
278 F.2d at 710 (over 60 days); O'Halloran v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 829,
831-33 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (77 days); Hall v. Maritime Administration, 1993 WL
139507, at *2 (E.D. La. April 27, 1993) (126 days); Landry v. United States, 815 F.
Supp. 1000, 1003 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (110 days), affd, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 7656
(5th Cir. March 29, 1994); Erdman v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 713 F. Supp. 706,
709 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (80 days); Pezzola v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 544, 544-48
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But what about the middle, thirty to fifty day range? Research
turned up no cases in this range. Thus, if the admiralty
plaintiff serves her admiralty complaint on the United States
during this range, she has little, if any, assurance that she has
complied with the SAA's forthwith service condition.
In 1983, Rule 4(m) was added to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 6 This new federal civil rule specified an expandable
120 day service period in admiralty cases involving the United
States. 7 At the time this new rule was propounded, some
admiralty plaintiffs may have assumed that the new rule's
expandable 120 day service period superseded the SAA's
somewhat wooden forthwith service condition-along with that
condition's middle range ambiguities. But such an assumption
would have been not only overly optimistic, but also premature.
Of the circuits which concern themselves regularly with
admiralty questions, the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
did not allow the new uniform service period to supersede the
SAA's forthwith service condition. 8 Only the Third Circuit has

(C.D.N.Y. 1985) (over 365 days); Halperlin v. United States, 610 F. Supp. 8, 12-13
(S.D. Fla. 1985) (93 days); Brown v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 472, 474 (C.D.
Cal. 1975) (over 240 days); Glover v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y.
1952) (approximately 305 days); Marich v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 829, 832
(N.D. Cal. 1949) (over 365 days); Bans v. United States, 1988 A.M.C. 2547 (D.
Mass. 1988) (188 days); Lee v. United States, 1983 A.M.C. 65, 66 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(70 days); Moore v. United States, 1978 A.M.C. 815, 816 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (over 90
days); Smyer v. United States, 1978 A.M.C. 817, 820 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (98 days);
Orpen v. United States, 1973 A.M.C. 914, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (approximately 335
days).
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). This rule was previously located at FED. R. CIV. P.
4(j). The rule is found at its current location as a result of 1993 amendments to
the federal procedural rules. The reader will note that, while materials cited in
this Comment refer internally to the rule at its previous location, this Comment
refers to the rule at its new location and infers that materials cited intend
reference to the rule at its present location.
7 This service period can be expanded either by the plaintiff's motion under
Rule 6(b), FED. R. CIV. P., or by failing to serve within Rule 4(m)'s 120 day service
period and then showing "good cause" for such failure. 128 CONG. REC. H9851-52
(daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982), reprinted in JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, FEDERAL CIVIL RULES, pt. 1, § 4.2[3] (1993). The 1993 amendment to
Rule 4(m) allows the court to extend the service period without a showing of good
cause. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) advisory committee's notes, reprinted in JAMES W.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, FEDERAL CML RULES, pt. 1, § 4.1[2]
(1994). This new provision of Rule 4(m) will come to bear on this Comment's
analysis at a later stage.
8 Libby, 840 F.2d at 820; Watts, 752 F.2d at 408; Amella, 732 F.2d at 712;
Kenyon, 676 F.2d at 1231; McAllister Bros., 278 F.2d at 710.
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allowed such a result. 9 The Fifth Circuit has,
remarkably, remained mostly silent on this issue. 10

rather

Which of the circuits, if any, is right about the effect of
Rule 4(m) on the SAA's forthwith service condition? For the
benefit of the admiralty plaintiff, this Comment attempts to
answer this question. To do so, this Comment analyzes two key
cases on point, Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Mon River
Towing, Inc., n a Third Circuit case holding that Rule 4(m)
supersedes the SAA's forthwith service condition, and Libby v.

9 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 772 F.2d at 63-6. But cf Libby, 840 F.2d at 82021 (holding that, while Rule 4(m)'s 120 day service period does not supersede the
forthwith service condition, it may nevertheless act as a "benchmark" in
determining what qualifies as forthwith); see NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME
PERSONAL INJURIES § 8:4 (4th ed. 1990) (misconstruing Libby as holding that Rule
4(m) supersedes the forthwith service condition; a discussion making this
misconstrual more obvious follows below).
10 The Fifth Circuit has not, however, been altogether silent. In one
unpublished case, the Fifth Circuit appeared to hold that forthwith service was
still a condition which had to be met in order for the court to have jurisdiction
over the sovereign. K.ieu v. United States, 1993 A.M.C. 1789, 1790-92 (5th Cir.
1992) (quoting Amella, 732 F.2d at 730) (holding that plaintiff never properly
served the United States and, impliedly, that plaintiff did not serve forthwith as
required by § 742 of the SAA; stating that "'[f]ailure to comply with the forthwith
service demand of §742 [sic] is a jurisdictional defect which denies a court subject
matter jurisdiction in the controversy'"). Two further points are noteworthy here.
First, the Fifth Circuit chose not to publish Kieu, because it regarded forthwith
service "as a well-settled principle of law." 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1. Second, if this
interpretation of Kieu is correct, then the Fifth Circuit, while not addressing the
Rule 4(m) question directly, has set a precedent regarding whether or not the
forthwith service condition has been superseded by another of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (Rule 15(c)). Under local Fifth Circuit rules, unpublished cases do
have precedential value. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3.
Since Kieu, two Fifth Circuit district courts' decisions have held that the
forthwith service condition remains unaffected by the presence of Rule 4(m), while
two others have held the opposite, i.e., that the forthwith service condition has
been superseded. See Hall v. United States, No. CIV.A. 92-3020, 1993 WL 139507,
at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 1993); Landry, 815 F. Supp. at 1002-3 (both holding that
the forthwith service conditions still applies). But see Holmberg v. OMI Ship
Management, Inc., No. CIV.A. 92-3749, 1993 WL 165774, at *1-2 (E.D. La. May 6,
1993); Estain v. United States, No. CIV.A. 92-479, 1992 WL 125348, at *1-2 (E.D.
La. June 2, 1992) (both holding that the forthwith service condition has been
superseded).
Prior to Kieu, at least three Fifth Circuit opinions seemed to adopt the Third
Circuit's Jones & Laughlin Steel pro-Rule 4(m)/anti-forthwith service position.
Diversified Marine International, Inc. v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 1005, 1008
(E.D. La. 1991); Farnsworth v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., No. CIV.A. 87-5954, 1989
WL 20544, at *1 (E.D. La. March 7, 1989); Phillips, 629 F. Supp. at 971.
11 772 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1985).
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United States/ 2 an Eleventh Circuit case holding the contrary.
This Comment then discusses how these two cases, taken
together, suggest a new argument for undoing the SAA's
forthwith service condition. Finally, this Comment concludes
that, at least until such time as Rule 4(m) unambiguously
carries the day, admiralty plaintiffs would do well to serve
their admiralty complaints on the United States "forthwith",
that is, on the same day they file them or very soon
thereafter. 13

II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT ARGUMENT AGAINST FORTHWITH
SERVICE

In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Third Circuit decided that
the Rule 4(m)'s service period superseded the SAA's forthwith
service condition to the maritime waiver of sovereign
immunity. 14

A. Facts of the Case
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Engineers}-ultimately
the United States, appellee-operates the Maxwell Lock and
Dam, located on the Monongahela River in Fayette County,
Pennsylvania. 15 Downstream from this dam, appellant Jones
& Laughlin Steel, Inc. (J&L) operates a preparation plant
which relies on the Monongahela's water level for transportation purposes. 16 In January of 1982, an empty barge belonging
to appellee Mon River Towing Company, Inc. (Mon River),
"broke free, floated down river, and lodged in an open gate at
the dam." 17 In order to dislodge this empty barge from the
open gate at the dam, the Engineers found it necessary to low-

12 840 F.2d 818 (11th Cir. 1988).
13 The difficulties involved in serving this way are minimal. Instructions on
how to serve the United States are easy to come by. See 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1988);
FED R. CIV. P. 4(i) (both giving detailed instructions on how to serve the United
States).
Caveat: The United States has not been served for the purposes of the
forthwith service condition until both the local United States Attorney and the U.S.
Attorney General have been properly served. Amella, 732 F.2d at 712; Battaglia v.
United States, 303 F.2d 683, 685-86 (2d. Cir 1962); Rodriguez v. Tisch, 688 F.
Supp. 1530, 1531 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
14 772 F.2d at 63-66.
15 !d. at 63.
16 !d.
17 !d.
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er the Monongahela's water level. 18 This action on the part of
the Engineers caused the downstream J&L plant to suffer an
economic loss. 19
In January of 1984, prior to the running of the SAA's twoyear statute of limitations, 20 and after realizing the unlikelihood of recovery vis a vis administrative channels, J &L filed an
admiralty complaint against the United States and Mon River
in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. 21 The day after filing this complaint, J&L
served its summons and complaint on the Engineers at their
offices in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 22 Two months later, an
Assistant United States Attorney sent J&L a letter informing
J&L that, in order for its suit to proceed, it would need to comply with the instructions of the federal procedural rules respecting both timely service 23 and the method for effecting
service on the United States. 24 Days later and before the end
of the 120 day service period, J&L served the United States as
directed by the Assistant United States Attorney's letter. 25
The United States then had a sudden change of heart and
took the position that it should be dismissed from the action,
based on the following two-step argument: step one, the sole
basis for jurisdiction in the suit against the United States was
the SAA; step two, by failing properly to serve the United
States until two months after filing its complaint, J&L failed to
serve the United States forthwith as jurisdictionally required
by § 742 of the SAA. 26 This change of position raised for the

18 ld.
19 ld.
20 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1988).
21 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 772 F.2d at 63.
22 ld.
23 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (formerly 4(j)).
24 ld.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i) (formerly 4(d)(4)).
25 ld.
26 ld. at 63-64. This particular paragraph (the paragraph in which the Third
Circuit notes this quick change in the United States' position) seems to be the key
paragraph in Jones & Laughlin Steel. In this paragraph, the Third Circuit reveals
its disgust for the United States' quick change in position regarding the applicability of Rule 4(m); that is, for the United States' willingness, first to lead J&L down
the primrose path of believing that the Federal Rules were controlling with respect
to service issues, then suddenly to switch service laws on J&L when it was too
late for J&L to do anything about it, when their claim would be time-barred if dismissed. For, by this time in the action the SAA's two year statute limitations had
run, so that if J&L was dismissed for service reasons, it would have, for intents
and purposes, been dismissed with prejudice.
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first time, in the district as well as in the Third Circuit, the
issue of whether or not Rule 4(m) supersedes the forthwith service condition of§ 742 of the SAA. Looking to the Second and
Ninth Circuits for guidance, 27 the district court then adopted
the United States' position and dismissed the United States
from the action. 28 When J &L appealed the Third Circuit reversed, holding that Rule 4(m) supersedes the forthwith service
condition of the SAA. 29

B. Reasoning of the Court
Reduced to propositional form, the Third Circuit's argument in favor of Rule 4(m) works as follows:
1. Under the Rules Enabling Act, 30 Rule 4(m) supersedes
any inconsistent federal procedural laws;31
2. The SAA's forthwith service condition is a federal procedural (and merely procedural) law;32

27 See Kenyon, 676 F.2d at 1231; McAllister Bros., 278 F.2d at 710.
28 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 772 F.2d at 64.
29 !d. at 66.
30 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988) (amending ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)) (authorizing, inter alia, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see Stephen B. Brockbank,
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015-1197 (1982) (providing a
thorough history and background on the Act); see also 2 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL.
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.02 (1993) (briefly reviewing the history and effect
of the Act).
31 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 772 F.2d at 66; see Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988) (declaring that "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules [as are enabled by this act, e.g., Rule 4(m)] shall be of no further force or effect after such
rules have taken effect").
32 !d. at 65-66 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 743 (1988), which declares that admiralty actions against the United States permitted under the SAA "shall proceed
and shall be heard and determined according to the principles of law and to the
rules of practice obtaining in like cases between private parties," and, thus, implying that the SAA did not intend to give the United States a special procedural,
hypertechnical defense otherwise not available "in like cases between private parties"). The Third Circuit here relied on the twin arguments of Judges Friendly and
Boochever who disagreed with the case law in their own respective circuits, the
Second and the Ninth, regarding whether or not the SAA's forthwith service condition was indeed a condition. See Battaglia, 303 F.2d at 686-87 (Friendly, J., concurring) (expressing the opinion that once the United States, in the first two sentences of 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1988), grants its general maritime waiver of sovereign
immunity, maritime actions against the United States, at least with respect to procedural questions, proceed as if brought against a private admiralty defendant);
Kenyon, 676 F.2d at 1231-32 (Boochever, J., concurring) (arguing along similar lines
as Judge Friendly in Battaglia and indicating that the SAA's forthwith service language was in fact intended only as a technical, procedural apparatus for dealing
with suits in admiralty brought against the United States under the SAA and
that, after the adoption of the uniform Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966,
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3. The SAA's forthwith service condition is inconsistent with
Rule 4(m);33 (1 & 2)
4. Hence, Rule 4(m) supersedes the SAA's forthwith service
condition. 34 (1 & 3)

Using principles of formal logic, it will be possible to analyze quickly the Third Circuit's argument. Of course, as is apparent, the Third Circuit's argument is deductively valid,
meaning that if all of its premises are true, then its conclusion
must also be true. But a deductively valid argument is not
necessarily a sound or true argument. In order to deny the
conclusion of a valid argument, it must be shown that at least
one of the argument's premises is false. Assuming for the moment then that the conclusion of the Third Circuit's argument
is false, it will be of some value to determine which of the
argument's premises is most likely to be false.
Given the statutory foundation of premise number one and
the conclusory nature of premise number three, the obvious
candidate for falsehood is premise number two-the premise in
which the Third Circuit opines the SAA's forthwith service
condition to be merely procedural. It is with this premise that
the Eleventh Circuit expressly disagrees with the Third Circuit.
For further commentary on the Third Circuit's argument then,
it will be useful to examine the Eleventh Circuit's argument.
III.

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF
FORTHWITH SERVICE

In Libby v. United States, 35 the Eleventh Circuit expressly
disagreed with the Third Circuit's decision in Jones & Laughlin
Steel, and decided that Rule 4(m)'s service period did not and
could not supersede the SAA's forthwith service condition to
maritime waiver of sovereign immunity. 36

especially with respect to admiralty actions, such an apparatus might well be supplemented, if not made obsolete, by the uniform Federal Rules). Both Judge
Friendly and Judge Boochever, however, declined to break totally with that case
law on stare decisis grounds.
33 See Jones & Laughlin Steel, 772 F.2d at 63-66. Although the court never
directly states this premise of this argument, the premise may be implied from the
facts as an enthymeme of the court's argument.
34 !d.
35 840 F.2d 818 (11th Cir. 1988).
36 !d. at 820-21.
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A. Facts of the Case
In March of 1984, Michael Libby (Libby) was injured while
working aboard a vessel belonging to the United States. 37 In
March of 1986, one day before the running of the SAA's two
year statute of limitations, 38 Libby filed an admiralty action
against the United States in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida. 39 Twenty-four days later,
Libby completed service on the United States. 40 In response to
this twenty-four day "delay" in service, the United States
moved to be dismissed on the grounds that Libby had failed to
serve forthwith as required by§ 742 of the SAAY
The Middle District, apparently not impressed with the
United States' Draconian interpretation of forthwith service,
denied the United States' motion and held instead that the
expandable 120 day service period established by Rule 4(m)
superseded the SAA's forthwith service condition. 42 On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the reasoning of the lower
court, holding that Rule 4(m)'s service period did not and could
not supersede the SAA's ''jurisdictional" forthwith service condition.43 The Eleventh Circuit, however, went on to affirm the
district court's result, holding, inter alia, that service twentyfour days after filing was sufficiently forthwith. 44

B. Reasoning of the Court
Reduced to propositional form, the Eleventh Circuit's argument in favor of forthwith service looks like this:
5. Under the Rules Enabling Act, Rule 4(m) may not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive or jurisdictional right. 45

37 !d. at 819.
38 46 U.S.C. app. § 745 (1988); see Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 782
(19R8) (adopting, inter alia, the SAA's forthwith service condition).
39 Libby, 840 F.2d at 819.
40 !d.
41 !d. As in note 28, supra, this part of the case seems to be the turning
point for the United States. Perhaps if the United States had refrained from employing the forthwith service defense after being served only 24 days after filing,
the Eleventh Circuit would never have announced its "benchmark" theory for determining what service amounts to forthwith service. As is explained later, it is this
benchmark theory which may ultimately undo the United States' forthwith service
defense altogether.
42 !d.
43 !d. at 820-21.
44 !d. at 821-22.
45 !d. at 820; see Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988) (stating
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6. In addition to whatever procedural functions it performs,
the SAA's forthwith service condition involves at least these
three substantive and jurisdictional rights: 46
(a) The sovereign's absolute substantive right to condition its waivers of sovereign immunity; 47
(b) The admiralty plaintiff's conditional substantive
right to sue the sovereign;48 and
(c) The federal judiciary's conditional jurisdiction over
the sovereign. 49
7. Allowing Rule 4(m) to supersede the SAA's forthwith service condition results in:
(a) an abridgement of the sovereign's absolute substantive right to condition its waivers of sovereign immunity
(i.e., the sovereign could be sued despite the fact that
one of the conditions to its maritime waiver-forthwith
service-has not been met); 50
(b) an enlargement of the admiralty plaintiff's conditional substantive right to sue the sovereign (i.e., the
admiralty plaintiff would be allowed to sue the sovereign
without complying with all of the sovereign's conditions-conditions which include forthwith service);51
and
(c) a modification of the federal judiciary's conditional
jurisdiction over the sovereign (i.e., the federal judiciary

that the Federal "[R]ules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right"); see also Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941); United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 589-90 (both stating that, when the Rules Enabling Act
prohibits the Federal Rules from abridging, enlarging or modifying substantive
rights, it also intends to prohibit the Federal Rules from abridging, enlarging or
modifying the jurisdiction of the federal courts); see FED. R. Crv. P. 82 (recognizing
Sibbach and Sherwood principle that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not to
extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts).
46 As the Third Circuit did in Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Eleventh Circuit
in Libby took an interest in the location of the SAA's forthwith service language
within the Act. The Eleventh Circuit found that, because the forthwith service
language was in the SAA section that actually announced and defmed the maritime waiver of sovereign immunity, § 742, rather than in the SAA's procedural
matters section, § 743, it was only correct to interpret the forthwith service language as being part of the waiver and, therefore, jurisdictional. 840 F.2d at 820.
47 Libby, 840 F.2d at 820.
48 !d.
49 !d. at 820-21 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538
(1980)).
50 !d.
51 !d.
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would be allowed to hail the sovereign into court without
enforcing all of the conditions of the sovereign's maritime waiver of immunity). 52 (5 & 6)
8. Hence, Rule 4(m) may not supersede the SAA's forthwith
service condition to the maritime waiver of sovereign immunity.53 (6 & 7)

The Eleventh Circuit's argument is deductively valid. It is
in premise number six-the premise in which a substantive
and jurisdictional role is suggested for the SAA's forthwith
service condition-that the Eleventh Circuit parts ways with
the Third Circuit.
Not surprisingly, this point of departure happens at the
most vulnerable part of the argument. For, if there is a doubtful premise in the Eleventh Circuit's argument it is premise
six. This is true for reasons similar to those described above
regarding the doubtfulness of premise two. Premise five is well
founded in the plain language of the Rules Enabling Act. Premise seven is a conclusion based on premises five and six. Premise six involves the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the
SAA, an interpretation directly at odds with that of the Third
Circuit.
The Third Circuit, as expressed in premise two, believes
that the SAA's forthwith service condition is merely procedural
and, therefore, that Rule 4(m) supersedes that condition by
virtue of the Rules Enabling Act. The Eleventh Circuit, as
expressed in premise six, believes that, in addition to any procedural function it may serve, the SAA's forthwith service condition has substantive as well as jurisdictional content and,
hence, that the Rules Enabling Act prevents Rule 4(m) from
changing that condition in any way. Apparently, the Third and
Eleventh Circuits are stalemated. They would be, except for the
fact that after giving the appearance of favoring the SAA's
forthwith service condition, the Eleventh Circuit went on cleverly to undermine the forthwith service condition by suggesting
a new theory for determining when service is forthwith.

52 ld.
53 ld. at 821.
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The Eleventh Circuit's Argument Against Forthwith
Service

To its conclusion upholding the SAA's forthwith service
condition, the Eleventh Circuit added this proviso: that, while
Rule 4(m) did not and could not supersede the SAA's forthwith
service condition, it might well serve as a "benchmark" for
determining when service is forthwith. 54 In effect, the Eleventh Circuit offered this new premise:
9. Nothing prevents the court from using Rule 4(m)'s service
period as a ''benchmark" for determining what constitutes
forthwith service in a contemporary litigation setting.

This new ''benchmark" premise appears to be what the
admiralty plaintiff has been waiting for: a readily comprehensible, straightforward statement of what the SAA's forthwith
service condition actually requires. What this new premise
means, at least on its face and as applied in Libby, is that, if
the admiralty plaintiff serves the United States within the time
allowed by Rule 4(m), then the admiralty plaintiff probably
serves forthwith. 55 When combined with premises one through
eight above, this premise means that, whether or not the SAA's
forthwith service condition is merely procedural or has substantive, jurisdictional content, Rule 4(m) applies, either directly or
as an afterthought. This would be true whether it supersedes
the SAA's obsolete forthwith service condition (as in the Third
Circuit) or because it serves as a benchmark in the determina-

54 840 F.2d at 821.
55 As noted earlier, Rule 4(m)'s 120 day service period is expandable. It
would be pure speculation and beyond the scope of this Comment to guess what
the Eleventh Circuit might do in the situation where the admiralty plaintiff serves
the United States after the 120 days but within an allowable expanded period, say
a period of 150 days with a showing of good cause. One could argue that the Eleventh Circuit's preference in this matter would be as follows: keep things simple
and uniform; if it is good enough for Rule 4(m), it ought to be good enough for
forthwith service. There is no good reason for setting up jurisdictional traps in
which to snare unwitting admiralty plaintiffs. However, the most recently amended
version of the 120 day rule suggests that this reasoning may be overly generous.
The amended rule allows the court to expand the service period on its own motion
and without any showing of good cause. Based on the reasoning above, this would
mean, at least from the Government's perspective, that a federal court would have
the power, as a matter of discretion, to expand its jurisdiction over the United
States in admiralty actions, a result prohibited by the Rules Enabling Act and the
federal procedural rules themselves. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988); FED R. CIV. P. 82.
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tion of when the SAA's forthwith service condition has been
satisfied (as in the Eleventh Circuit).
The admiralty plaintiff, however, is not yet in a position to
be at ease in assuming that mere compliance with Rule 4(m)'s
service limit will render service on the United States forthwith
as required by the SAA. The Eleventh Circuit merely said that
Rule 4(m)'s uniform service period might properly serve as a
benchmark in determining when service is forthwith. It did not
say that Rule 4(m)'s service limit would serve as a benchmark.
Nor did it say that Rule 4(m)'s service limit would serve as the
benchmark. In short, the Eleventh Circuit left open the possibility that other benchmarks might still exist, including those
established in earlier, albeit inadequate jurisprudence-jurisprudence which failed to offer the admiralty plaintiff assurances in the middle or thirty to fifty days range.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Third Circuit takes one of
the possible approaches to solving the forthwith service problem. The Third Circuit declared the SAA's forthwith service
condition merely procedural and, by that means, allowed Rule
4(m)'s service limit to supersede the SAA's forthwith service
condition as required by the Rules Enabling Act. In order to
follow the Third Circuit's approach, a court would have to overlook significant jurisprudence holding the forthwith service condition to be more than merely procedural.
In Libby, the Eleventh Circuit takes the benchmark approach to solving the forthwith service problem, preventing
Rule 4(m)'s service limit from undermining the SAA's forthwith
service condition, but nonetheless allowing Rule 4(m) to operate
as a criterion in the determination of when an admiralty
plaintiff's service on the United States satisfies the condition.
The benchmark approach, of course, avoids the problems involved in overlooking significant jurisprudence on point. For
circuits such as the Second and the Ninth, which hold the
forthwith service condition to be at least partly jurisdictional,
the Eleventh Circuit's benchmark approach offers a possibility
for changing course on the forthwith service issue without
overtuming circuit precedent. To make the benchmark approach work as desired, and to make the service standard for
plaintiffs suing the United States in admiralty completely unambiguous, however, the service limit of Rule 4(m) must be
recognized as the only criterion for determining when service
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qualifies as service forthwith. Such a holding, however, could
be undesirable, if the result thereof was tantamount to granting the federal courts discretionary power to enlarge their admiralty jurisdiction over the United States-especially in cases
where no showing of good cause for tardy service is provided,
as unamended Rule 4(m) strictly required. If this were the
result, then it would have to be said that Rule 4(m) did what
the Rules Enabling Act and Rule 82 forbade: namely, that Rule
4(m) modified the substantive rights of both the sovereign and
admiralty plaintiffs and enlarged the admiralty jurisdiction of
the federal courts over the sovereign.
A parting word to the wise: At least until such a time as
Rule 4(m) unambiguously carries the day, admiralty plaintiffs
would be well-advised to serve their admiralty complaints on
the United States "forthwith"-on the day of filing or very soon
thereafter.
James David Phipps

